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Bilateral Aid To Improve Human
Rights
Donors need to adopt a more coherent and thoughtful strategy
Sophia Woodman
1 Aid to legal projects in China aimed, in the eyes of the donors, at improving human
rights conditions on the ground there have become a centrepiece of the policy of many
Western countries towards China’s human rights situation since the late 1990s1. These
projects are part of a package of bilateral “dialogue and co-operation” that replaced the
more critical multilateral approaches focused on the annual effort to pass resolutions
at  the  annual  sessions  of  the  UN Commission on Human Rights  that  had been the
principal  vehicle  for  Western  states’  concerns  about  continuing  human  rights
violations in China in the early to mid 1990s 2. 
2 The  alternative  approach  taken  up  combined  regular  “dialogues”  in  which  human
rights  were  discussed,  mostly  between  diplomats behind  closed  doors,  but  also
sometimes including accompanying seminars bringing together “experts” from both
sides,  and  Western-funded  “co-operation”  programmes  in  China  to  address  human
rights concerns through a variety of projects. The most common focus of these projects
has  been  law  and  legal  reform,  as  both  China  and  its  partners  chose  this  as  an
acceptably neutral entry point for their co-operation.
3 This article examines the strategy behind programmes of bilateral aid directed to legal
reform  and  law-related  projects3 in  China  of  nine  countries:  Australia,  Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom
(UK); and one regional institution, the European Union (EU). 
4 The choice of countries has been determined by two main criteria: programmes are
part of a “human rights dialogue and co-operation” package that has been underway in
most cases for five or more years 4, and a substantial programme of aid to legal projects
has been established during this period which is more or less explicitly linked to the
human rights dialogues, and thus to achieving human rights objectives 5. Information
on  these  programmes  has  been  collected  from  a  variety  of  sources,  including
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documentation provided by governments and implementing agencies6 and interviews
with staff of the implementing agencies and with representatives of donors 7.
5 Although it has made a substantial commitment to funding “rule of law” programmes
in China, in part as a way to address human rights concerns, the United States is not
included in this  study as it  has not really adopted the “dialogue and co-operation”
approach, since a corollary of this is eschewing more critical action on China’s human
rights  situation,  particularly  the  sponsoring  of  censure  resolutions  at  the  UN
Commission on Human Rights, and the US-China dialogue on human rights has been
more off than on over the last few years. In addition, there has already been significant
examination  by  scholars  of  US-funded  legal  programmes  in  China  8,  while,  to  my
knowledge, almost nothing has been written in English on the programmes studied
here.
Standards of assessment
6 Even when researchers have direct access to all relevant data, such as internal project
documents, participants and intended beneficiaries, the impact of aid-funded projects
that seek to change ideas and address entrenched patterns of institutional behaviour is
notoriously hard to assess. Causation is often difficult to establish, and inputs may not
be  of  a  kind  that  can  be  expected  to  have  an  immediate  effect.  Given  the  lack  of
transparency of many donors in relation to the programmes under review here, the
broad comparative scope of the study and the fact that many projects are likely to have
a  long-term rather  than immediate  impact,  making  such  judgements  on  the  China
projects would be unwise, if not impossible. Thus the aim of this research project has
not been to assess the effects of the aid programmes under review, but to examine the
strategy that has informed them, reflected in their procedures and substantive content,
in  order  to  determine  whether  they  are  employing  the  most  effective  means  and
methods available, in the circumstances, to achieve the objective of improving human
rights. This approach has been informed by study of the practice of such aid elsewhere. 
7 Although human rights has been a factor in the aid policies of many countries since the
1970s, significant attempts to use aid as a mechanism for achieving improvements in
human rights conditions were not seen until the 1980s and 1990s 9. Despite this shift,
political aid has been much less studied than development aid generally, while even
fewer  researchers  have  sought  to  examine  aid  programmes  specifically  aimed  at
achieving human rights objectives 10. Since much assistance to legal projects has tended
to be concentrated on working towards economic goals—whether through advice and
support  for  the  drafting  of  economic,  financial  and  commercial  laws,  or  through
support for strengthening legal institutions—study of aid to legal programmes has also
often neglected the human rights dimension. 
8 However,  a number of excellent studies published in the past few years do provide
some standards that can be applied to the programmes under review in this paper 11. In
particular,  a  2000  report  by  the  International  Council  on  Human  Rights  Policy
examined foreign aid to civil and criminal law-related programmes in four countries,
with a focus on collecting the views of recipients of aid 12.The conclusions of this study
are the most applicable to the material covered here, since it specifically concentrates
on aid to “the justice sector” aimed at human rights objectives, and this is also the
principal  focus  of  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  projects  under  review.  The
International Council’s main findings were that if done well, human rights aid to the
justice sector can have an important positive impact, but conversely, poorly thought
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out and executed assistance can actually be harmful.  The study proposes four main
criteria for determining if aid programmes have the potential to be successful: “on the
degree to which human rights are integrated into the development process as a whole;
on the adoption of a strategic approach; on the establishment of effective and honest
partnerships that recognise the authority of beneficiaries to direct reform efforts; and
on careful attention to challenges that particularly affect the justice sector”. Each of
these criteria incorporates a range of specific and detailed recommendations, some of
which will be drawn on in the analysis below.
9 Adding to their relevance as standards of assessment for this research project is that
fact that some of the perspectives emerging from the International Council study were
echoed in the interviews conducted for this project with Chinese legal practitioners
and scholars, the majority of whom had been involved in some way in donor projects 13.
In particular, Chinese informants concentrated on the need for effective strategy based
on greater control of programme agendas and specific projects by recipients, and on
more understanding of both actual needs on the ground in China and of the political
context,  as well as on a broader conception of human rights than most donors had
adopted.
10 First  this  article  describes  the  context  for  these  programmes,  starting  with  an
introduction to the approaches of the donors under study and a brief assessment of
rule of law as thematic focus. It goes on to explore a number of specific issues related to
strategy: the question of strategic planning, both on the part of donors and the Chinese
government;  the commitments made on both sides to these programmes,  including
funding levels for law and rights programming; potential and actual harm associated
with donor projects; levels of contextual knowledge among donors and how much is
learned from experience; the question of how needs are identified and by whom; and
the issues of substantive focus, choice of partners and co-ordination among donors.
The  article  concludes  with  some  thoughts  on  how  donors  could  improve  their
programming.
11 The concerns raised here should not obscure the fact that, while some were wary of
making generalisations, overall those scholars and practitioners in China involved in
donor-funded  legal  projects  and  exchanges  felt  they  were  beneficial  to  both  sides
involved. One such benefit was exposing people outside China to the realisation that
views within the country on human rights were not monolithic, according to a Chinese
informant.  The more constructive engagement there was on this topic,  the less the
Chinese  government  would  feel  threatened  by  human  rights-related  activities,  this
Chinese scholar said. There is certainly a need for foreign support for human rights-
related legal programmes, and the political space for programmes that can have an
important positive effect in encouraging and supporting individuals and groups that
are  committed  to  bringing  about  improvements  in  respect  for  human  rights  has
expanded in recent years. But as the analysis below indicates, there is also an urgent
need for much more strategic thinking about how this may best be done.
Donor approaches
12 The Western donor programmes studied here generally focus on strengthening “rule of
law” in China. In part, this approach is part of a broader strategy among aid donors
globally to concentrate on “strengthening” this aspect of what they term “governance”
14, linking it to both economic development and democratisation 15. Thus, generally rule
of law is not presented as a stand-alone goal in donor objectives, but is linked in with
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other aims 16.  There is  a  deep-seated—and possibly  erroneous—assumption that  the
kind of changes advocated under the rubric of “governance reforms” will inevitably
lead to improvements in protections for human rights 17. Some commentators question
whether  aid  to  "rule  of  law"  may  even  be  able  to  achieve  less  narrowly  focused
objectives:
13 Thus far the field of rule-of-law assistance has expanded less because of the tangible
successes of such work than because of the irresistible apparent connection of the rule
of  law  with  the  underlying  goals  of  market  economics  and  democracy  that  now
constitute the dual foundation of contemporary international aid.18
14 In the China context, the rule of law has been a key element of the broader bilateral aid
programmes of the countries under consideration, many of which make supporting the
development of a market economy in China through economic reform a principal focus.
Multinationals headquartered in the West have a strong interest in China developing a
legal system that can protect their investments,  and this concern may be the most
important reason why Western governments are keen to contribute to this aspect of
China’s  development.  An  official  of  the  Australian  Human  Rights  and  Equal
Opportunities Commission (HREOC)19 linked Australia’s human rights co-operation with
China to constructing a legal system in China that would facilitate trade, saying that
China's commitment to this objective made co-operation easier 20. Australia's possible
interest in legal reform for the same reason was not mentioned.
15 Despite commitments to human rights as an objective of aid policy, in the case of many
of the countries under review here, integrating human rights into overall development
aid  policy  often  seems  more  rhetoric  than  reality  when  it  comes  down  to  the
practicalities  of  working  out  a  programme  in  a  country  like  China  21.  The  donors
studied here either do not prepare strategy papers that provide analysis  of  China’s
human rights issues and how the interventions donors are supporting address them, or
incorporate  human  rights  only  in  a  very  broad  and  general  way  into  overall
development  co-operation  strategy  papers  22.  Overall,  donors  make  little  or  no
reference to or use of the information on human rights issues in China generated by
the UN mechanisms 23.
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Aid budgets
NB : 1 Figures for spending on country programs are from OECD Development Assistance Committee,
‘Net disbursements of ODA to individual recipients’, in Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid
Recipients 1993-1997, 1999, and the same publication for 1996-2000, published in 2002. In the
additional years provided for Australia and Sweden, information is from their respective international
development agencies. Figures for the EU are from European Commission, ‘Annex 5: Main ﬁgures and
estimates—EC cooperation 1998-2005’, in Country Strategy Paper: China 2001-2006, p. 39.
2 Figures in this column are not strictly comparable, as in many cases funds were spent primarily on
general legal training and not on rights-speciﬁc projects.
3 This ﬁgure represents annual budgets for HREOC (Australian Human Rights and Equal
Opportunities Commission) plus some funds disbursed by AusAID in the form of grants to
Chinese organizations.
4 Information supplied by the Danish Embassy in Beijing.
5 This is a rough estimate based on ﬁgures available for GTZ (German Technical Cooperation
Corporation) projects and an interview with German Justice Ministry, June 30th 2003. 
6 This ﬁgure represents spending on NCHR (Norwegian Centre for Human Rights) projects only.
7 This ﬁgure represents spending on RWI (Raoul Wallenberg Institute) projects only.
8 This ﬁgure represents spending on the Human Rights Project Fund only.
9 The larger ﬁgure represents totals for declared spending on all law and rights related projects.
However, the EC claims that 12.6% of total aid spent on ‘rule of law and human rights’. The ﬁgure in
brackets is spending on projects with a speciﬁc focus on human rights
16 Where human rights is mentioned as a focus for co-operation with China, the reference
is generally exclusively to civil and political rights, with added attention to be paid to
the rights of women, children and minorities. Virtually without exception, the legal co-
operation programmes do not address economic, social and cultural rights—although
these have been covered in trainings on international human rights law supported by
the Nordic countries—as donors assume that traditional development programmes take
care of this area. Where concern is expressed about the growth in inequality in China in
recent years24, this awareness does not appear to be applied to legal or human rights
programming.  There  has  been almost  no  effort  to  think  through how the  extreme
inequality that most donors say is now among their primary concerns is reflected in
the legal system.
17 The rule of law focus has led to a wide variety of donor approaches. The main methods
include  study  tours,  input  from  international  experts,  joint  research  projects  and
training inside and outside China, ranging from a few days to studying for academic
degrees.  The  programmes  studied  here  can  essentially  be  divided  into  two  main
categories:  those  based  on  comparative  law  “modelling”  and  those  focussing  on
international  human rights  law.  Most  of  the  programmes are  in  the  first  category,
presenting Western practice as a model for China to follow. Thus France and many
other donors have concentrated their programmes on improving the quality of legal
professionals through training, with the primary focus being on laws governing the
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economy. Germany has focused mainly on detailed technical assistance with specific
areas of law, also concentrating on commercial and financial law, and more recently, a
substantial number of projects on administrative law. Another approach still based on
modelling, exemplified by Canada, the Netherlands, the UK and the EU, has been to put
the bulk of funding into generalised legal programmes, while providing some support
for work in the area of criminal justice and a few specifically human rights focused
projects.  Australia has concentrated its funding on projects relating to the criminal
justice system, working almost exclusively with government agencies. 
18 The programmes of the Nordic countries are mainly in the second category. Although
their  starting point  was also "legal  exchange”,  Denmark,  Norway and Sweden have
consistently concentrated on international human rights law as their main entry point.
The combination of a set of agreed rules that apply to all—international human rights
standards—and a clear goal—building up education on the law that articulates those
standards—certainly qualifies  as  a  more strategic  approach than those of  the other
donors studied here. It is also one that emerges from the specific expertise that the
Nordic countries have to offer to a country like China, and thus does also incorporate
some degree of modelling and comparative work.
19 Donor  programmes  also  differ  greatly  in  the  method  of  project  implementation25.
However, in most cases the country’s foreign ministry or international development
agency allocates money, sometimes through a competitive bidding process, to domestic
implementers to run projects in China. In the cases of the Nordics and Australia, one
major implementer is essentially responsible for the whole programme26, while the UK
and  Germany  have  several  established  agencies  conducting  the  work,  and  Canada
mainly  channels  money  through  a  handful  of  domestic  institutions.  The  EU  has
established special project implementing bodies for its major projects, but also gives
grants to European and Chinese agencies for smaller projects. The Netherlands is an
exception in taking a hands-off approach, providing its funding through a grant-giving
programme which gives money to Chinese institutions for specific projects.
20 In the main, neither the Chinese side nor the donors have set clear objectives for the
programmes under review 27. The general approach to achieving what goals are set is
engagement, both through the dialogue and through co-operation—the co-operation
approach  centres  on  exchange,  and  is  thus  not  specifically  focussed  on  changing
Chinese  reality.  On  the  donor  side,  however,  the  co-operation  is  based  on  the
underlying assumption that China is committed to improving human rights, and can be
helped to do so through projects that, in a variety of ways, increase Chinese knowledge
of  solutions  to  human  rights  concerns  in  the  dialogue  countries28,  as  well  as  in
international human rights law 29.  Obviously it would be neither wise nor useful for
donors to set goals absent any commitment to achieving them on the Chinese side.
Where aims in terms of improving human rights are specified by the donors, these are
very broad and general—and in some cases, ambitious 30. Others assume that human
rights objectives are inherent to the rule of law agenda and need not be spelled out 31. 
21 On the  donor  side,  it  is  mainly  in  the  context  of  the  human rights  dialogues  that
statements  about  the  overall  policy  are  made,  with  comments  about  the  need  for
“practical results” being a common refrain. However, most donors also subscribe to the
view that the main effects of these programmes will only be seen in the long term.
22 Project planning by implementing agencies is more detailed and sets clearer objectives
since they have to justify what they are doing to the donors. In general, implementers’
Bilateral Aid To Improve Human Rights
China Perspectives, 51 | january-february 2004
6
goals are more modest than statements by donors. However, some implementers tend
to exaggerate the extent of positive developments in China and claim more credit for
them than might be warranted by the extent of their involvement 32.
23 The relative importance of China in the aid policies of the countries studied here varies
widely.  Germany is China's largest bilateral aid donor after Japan, giving sums that
dwarf the contributions of other donors. China was among the top three recipients of
Canadian aid in 2000-01, in Australia's top five individual aid-receiving countries for
the last  six  years,  while  it  was in the top 20 for  the United Kingdom. By contrast,
Denmark, Norway and Sweden give a relatively low priority to aid to China, as they all
concentrate  their  aid  on  a  selected  group  of  what  are  sometimes  known  as
"programme" countries that are among the world's poorest. However, due in part to
the  traditional  emphasis  of  the  Nordic  countries  on  human rights  in  their  foreign
policy and pressure from public opinion, for both Norway and Sweden the engagement
with  China  is  a  major  focus.  France  concentrates  its  aid  on  poor  countries  in  its
"priority solidarity zone”, which does not include China. Given its size, China ranks low
down as a recipient of EU aid 33.
"Rule of law" as entry point
Rule of law theorists may simply expect too much from law… Instead of reflexively
requiring that  China immediately  adopt  the institutional  attributes  of  a  mature
legal and judicial system operating in a mature constitutional culture and advanced
economic environment, rule-of-law theory needs to think a lot more about what
special conditions and needs face developing as opposed to developed societies.34 
24 Donors consistently describe their programmes as covering the "rule of law", but in
fact the Chinese side did not accept this appellation for these bilateral programmes,
preferring to describe what was being done as “legal co-operation” or “legal exchange”.
This indicates that the Chinese government is well aware that Western donors tend to
see  rule  of  law  not  in  a  narrow,  technical  or  “thin”  sense  35,  but  as  part  of  the
framework of liberal democracy. 
25 "Rule of law" is a highly contested term, both in China and in the West, a fact rarely
acknowledged by donors. As Tamanaha puts it, rule of law is like the notion of “the
good”, in the sense that “everyone is for it, but there is no agreement on precisely what
it is” 36. Since there is no agreement among scholars internationally about what rule of
law means, it hardly comes as a surprise that what donors think they are talking about
and what their Chinese partners are aiming for through these programmes may be very
different.
26 Despite the official endorsement of the idea of “ruling the country in accordance with
the law and establishing a socialist rule of law state”, adopted by Jiang Zemin in 1996,
incorporated into the communiqué of the Sixteenth CCP Congress in 1997 and into the
national  constitution in  1999 37,  the  debate  over  the  aims of  legal  reform in  China
continues to rage. Even those who are optimistic about the direction of China’s legal
development  do  not  necessarily  see  it  as  moving  towards  embracing  a  liberal
understanding of rights.  The evolution of a number of countries in the region with
highly developed legal systems supports such scepticism. As Jayasuriya writes,  “[I]n
East Asia, the rule of law—contrary to what is assumed in the liberal paradigm—can
serve to entrench and consolidate public or state power” 38. Some scholars argue that
constructing  a  legal  system  is  an  attempt  by  the  Chinese  ruling  elite  to  forestall
democratisation and maintain their hold on power 39.
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27 Whatever the aims of the leadership, there are undoubtedly people within the system
who are working towards greater respect for and protection of human rights through
law. And of course, it is far from certain that the Chinese leadership will be able to
control the eventual outcome of legal reforms. The lack of a conclusive view on the
direction  of  reform  should  not  preclude  international  involvement.  As  the
International  Council  study  emphasises,  even  when  government’s  “commitment  to
reform is very weak”, there are useful things aid can do, such as supporting reform
constituencies  and strengthening unofficial  institutions,  although even then donors
should not abandon work with official bodies 40. 
28 However, other factors call into question an exclusive focus on rule of law as an entry
point to working for human rights goals. First, the track record of rule of law assistance
elsewhere—even  given  a  greater  level  of  commitment  from  recipient  and  donor
governments—is not encouraging 41. Part of the problem may be that the gap between
expectations  and  reality  is  often  too  wide:  “Rule-of-law programmes  in  developing
countries are burdened with expectations that far exceed those placed on development
programmes in richer nations in a previous era” 42. A key question is how much legal
professionalisation and institution building can achieve in the absence of government
adherence to the normative values that are the stated or unstated objectives of donor
programmes. Studies of aid to legal reform show that an overly technical approach may
achieve little as it does not address the fact that certain deficiencies of legal systems
serve powerful interests, and thus there may be no incentive to change them 43. Also,
the  assumption  that  improvements  at  the  highest  levels  of  the  legal  system  will
automatically trickle down to lower levels may have as little foundation in reality as
the  economic  version  of  this  idea.  The  combination  of  highly  competent  legal
institutions  in  capital  cities  and  dysfunctional  ones  captured  by  local  elites  at  the
periphery is  not  a  phenomenon unique to  China,  but  common to many developing
countries 44. 
29 Second, the formal legal system may not be the most appropriate route to addressing
some of the particular problems donors are concerned about. An example is the likely
impact of efforts to improve professionalism in China’s criminal justice system. Hualing
Fu argues that given the priority accorded to “stability” and the fight against crime, in
fact the operation of the courts in this area is most closely in accord with existing law,
and thus the most “professional” and least corrupt judged by the internal standards of
the  Chinese  legal  system  45.  In  the  areas  of  civil  and  administrative  litigation,  the
establishment of a formal legal system may actually increase the costs of justice for the
poor, and make it less accessible for them 46. In China today, many of the most difficult
cases are taken on by “barefoot lawyers” without any formal training47,  while large
sections of the population in rural areas rely mainly on “legal workers”, not lawyers,
for legal advice 48. Qualified lawyers in some places are seeking to bar such paralegals
from representing clients or providing legal advice 49. 
30 Furthermore, the focus on the formal legal system does not necessarily reflect how
rights are asserted in society. For example, in China rural protesters frequently use
laws and regulations to support their arguments, but rarely consider going to court 50.
Such phenomena raise broader questions about the embeddedness of legal institutions
in society. As a Carnegie Endowment seminar on law reform concluded, “If law reform
is merely a social tool… [it] must arise from or be founded on underlying social change,
or endogenous demand. For some areas, such as human rights for unpopular ethnic
Bilateral Aid To Improve Human Rights
China Perspectives, 51 | january-february 2004
8
minorities,  external  pressure on either  the public  or  government may be the most
effective starting point”51.
Lack of strategic planning
Much  assistance  for  justice  reform  has  been  poorly  planned  and  coordinated.
Reforms would be more effective if both donors and beneficiaries adopted a more
strategic approach. At national level,  clear national policies and plans should be
formulated.  Donors  should  assist  these  efforts.  They  should  coordinate  their
activities better, avoid duplication, and improve their understanding of local needs.
52
31 In the programmes under study here, the kind of strategic planning advocated by the
International Council has mostly been notable by its absence. 
32 The incorporation of “ruling the country in accordance with the law and establishing a
socialist rule of law state” into the constitution in 1999 is often cited by donors as a
basis for their work in the field. But this constitutional change has not been followed
up with any road map for reform: the Chinese government has not developed concrete
plans for reform of the justice sector, for making human rights improvements, or for
the  legal  system  as  a  whole.  Many  legal  professionals  have  been  calling  for  the
establishment of some sort of planning process for legal reform for some time, as they
believe that in the legal system piecemeal and often conflicting reforms may sometimes
do more harm than good. 
33 For the moment, the only plans available are routine documents issued by individual
ministries or departments 53. In the main, these are not focused on achieving overall
goals for the legal system, let alone for human rights, but on the development of the
particular institution in question. While such plans may provide a good basis for co-
operation with one of these institutions, they do not identify the needs for the system
as a whole.
34 Donor  governments  do  not  appear  to  have  offered  to  support  official  planning
processes  for  legal  reform,  or  criminal  justice  reform,  as  they  have  done  in  other
countries54, nor have they tried to reach agreement with the Chinese government on
benchmarks that  might be achieved through co-operation programmes.  One reason
may be the assumption that  because China is  not  aid-dependent  donors  have little
leverage. Although the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has raised
the issue55, governments engaged in dialogues with China have not tried to encourage
Peking to formulate a National Human Rights Action Plan, as all governments agreed to
do at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, let alone offered to fund
the process 56. 
Low levels of commitment
35 Governments are only likely to make clear plans when they are committed to justice
reform. This element of a strategic approach will be considered on three levels: the first
will be to look at the level of domestic commitment to the kind of goals being pursued
by donors; the second, to examine the basis for co-operation agreed with the dialogue
countries; and the third, to explore the environment for co-operation as a reflection of
both of the first two factors.
36 "When compared with the efforts made for economic reform, the central government's
attitude towards judicial reform seems to reveal a lack of commitment”, one Chinese
scholar writes 57. While a full assessment of the current state of legal reforms in China
and of their potential impact on human rights conditions there is beyond the scope of
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this article, many legal scholars inside and outside China feel that currently the main
barriers to further institutional development (and human rights improvements) are
essentially  political  in  nature,  whether  allowing  real  judicial  independence,  the
allocation of resources, or breaking log-jams created by institutional rivalry by making
decisions on hard questions about division of responsibilities. As Peerenboom puts it,
“[T]he major obstacles to rule of law in China are systemic and institutional in nature”
58.
37 Many  of  the  Chinese  scholars  interviewed  identified  the principal  barrier  to  the
protection of human rights in the criminal justice system and more generally as being
political  will,  with  the  main  blockage  being  the  lack  of  political  reform.  Cultural
attitudes were also cited as an obstacle to change that would take a long time to shift.
One academic argued that one of the main constraints was lack of resources, which
would be needed to construct the legal system that was an essential prerequisite for the
protection of rights.
38 The weakness of law implementation is an example of the way institutional barriers are
blocking progress. As Chen writes, “The involvement of a multitude of organisations
and  factors  in  the  implementation  of  law  means  that  difficulties  and  problems
encountered by law-enforcement agencies in the process of the implementation of law
are often caused by a number of factors or a number of institutions. More importantly,
and logically then, efforts undertaken by individual authorities will not resolve these
problems”59. Even within one institution, the piecemeal approach to reform may have
undesirable  results.  Li  argues  that  despite  the  many reform measures  tried  by  the
courts, "because of the lack of a framework design, it seems that some measures are not
coherent and indeed are sometimes conflicting… when reform has reached a certain
stage it is necessary to have a clear goal and coherent design for further change”60. 
39 At the bilateral level, the difference over the “rule of law” label is just one indication of
the  fact  that  in  terms  of  joint  commitment  to  a  common  set  of  objectives,  the
programmes  under  study  began  on  a  weak  basis  with  little  in  the  way  of  specific
agreement between the two sides as to what the co-operation would entail in practice.
In all these donor programmes, co-operation in the field of human rights was launched
from a minimalist platform of “legal exchanges” agreed in human rights dialogues or
other diplomatic interactions. In the case of the UK, legal exchanges had already been
underway for some years61 and were thus a logical choice, while the work of private
foundations, most notably the Ford Foundation, was frequently seen as a model for
combining a focus on rights with work on law.
40 In  a  1999  assessment  of  Swedish  human  rights  training  programmes  in  China,
Mellbourn and Svensson identified a lack of shared objectives as problematic and called
for more frank and open discussion between the Chinese and Swedish sides about the
nature and aims of the programme 62.  Currently, only in the Australia-China human
rights dialogue and the German-Chinese rule of law dialogue are specific co-operation
programmes regularly discussed.  Some representatives of  donors and implementing
agencies thought that it was better this way, as the dialogues were overly politicised
events with little real substance involving people who knew little or nothing about the
practicalities of co-operation.
41 Even after the agreement to co-operate, most Chinese officials remained allergic to
mention  of  human  rights  as  a  focus  of  the  co-operation,  and  to  some  extent  this
continues to date. For example, staff of the Australian HREOC said that while initially,
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Chinese officials did not accept that they had any human rights problems that could be
dealt with through the co-operation, they now acknowledge that Australian assistance
may help resolve certain deficiencies in their legal system. But these are not framed in
terms of human rights, and therefore HREOC "rarely use[d] the human rights term in
response”63.  According  to  Sweden's  Raoul  Wallenberg  Institute,  if  the  term  human
rights is mentioned in descriptions of projects that involve foreign participation, the
organisers may run the risk of cancellation64. The continuing sensitivity of the term is
highlighted  by  the  fact  that  the  Canadian  International  Development  Agency  had
originally planned to drop the term "human rights and democratic development" from
the new country development policy framework now under preparation, and refer only
to  "good  governance”,  the  goal  of  which  would  be  to  "support  Chinese  efforts  to
increase rule of law as a means to uphold the rights of its women and men”65. After the
proposed change met with an outcry from Canadian NGOs, CIDA backed down 66.
42 Another indication of commitment levels is the fact that many of the projects still take
place in a very difficult environment, despite the upbeat tone of most donors’ public
statements.  In  the  Chinese  bureaucracy,  there  is  still  considerable  hostility  and
suspicion to foreign co-operation in certain quarters.  For example,  local authorities
ordered that the proceedings of a 2001 three week Nordic workshop in Jilin province
for Chinese law teachers on international human rights law be videotaped 67. “Anything
involving international elements and human rights in China is still very sensitive”, said
one Chinese scholar, while another said foreign involvement in law per se remained
sensitive. Foreign funding was less of a problem than foreign participation, especially if
the project involved examination of conditions on the ground, added another. 
43 Academics have consistently been less scared of centring co-operation around human
rights—although in practice the work done has often stayed on a fairly abstract level—
and this is one reason why many donors are more inclined to focus their co-operation
on work with them. Chinese academics engaging foreign counterparts on human rights
and researching the subject was an aspect of the official response to the isolation China
suffered after the 1989 massacre 68. This does not mean that scholars are free to engage
as they wish, however, as the incident described above shows. Teachers who lecture on
international  human rights  law have to  be aware of  the fact  that  students  may be
reporting on what  they say  in  class  to  the  authorities,  and this  can get  them into
trouble. A statement by an official in a rare article on foreign aid in China published in
a  popular  Chinese  magazine  presented a  paranoid  view of  donor  engagement  with
academics: 
There is no free lunch in this world. If the other side needs to find out something,
they support your experts to do a study, to do some research, and when it is done,
they take all the material away. Some of these things the government doesn’t even
know about… The origins of the figures some scholars use are problematic, they are
not very accurate; some should really be considered estimates, but they don’t even
check  them and  just  put  them out.  This  can  have  a  really  bad  effect,  and  can
become a human rights bomb that is used against you.69
44 Despite their clear focus on international standards, the three Nordic human rights
institutes’ work has not been without difficulty. While the climate for human rights
research and education in universities has certainly improved in recent years, the field
remains hemmed in by political restrictions. A university lecturer prefaces his human
rights course with an admonition to students not to choose to specialise in this field,
since “…it  is  morally embarrassing,  economically unprofitable,  politically dangerous
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and academically difficult”70.  In addition, “there is… the problem of scarce financial
resources  and  a  pressing  need  for  educated  legal  personnel  in  other  areas  of  law.
Students have difficulties seeing any use in deepening their knowledge of human rights
law since there are very few career opportunities for experts in the field in China.
Chinese law teachers engaged in human rights law research are used to keeping a low
profile  and  often  work  without  any  administrative  or financial  support  from  the
university authorities”71. However, since this comment was written, the situation has
started to change, as universities compete to set up human rights centres—five were set
up just in the past year72—and find donor funds to support them. Domestic funding,
however,  is  generally  still  unavailable  73.  There  are  initial  indications  that  student
interest in human rights courses is rising 74.
45 Considered in purely financial terms, the relative priority accorded to law and rights
programming in China does not match the rhetorical weight many of China’s dialogue
partners give to this co-operation (See table). The limited nature of the human and
financial  resources available makes the question of  appropriate strategy even more
important.  For  the  majority  of  donors  covered  here,  law  and  rights  projects
represented well below 5% of their overall aid programme in China, although Canada,
Denmark and Sweden were all above this level. In China much more money is spent on
aid to legal projects relating to the economy, commerce and finance than on human
rights-related projects 75. This is not unique to China: aid spending on human rights
globally is low 76. For example, between 1995 and 1999, under 1% of the EU’s external
aid budget went to “human rights positive measures” 77. 
46 Of  course  the  low  level  of  funding  also  reflects  commitment  on  the  Chinese  side,
particularly  the  relatively  restrictive  climate  for  such  programming  and  the  small
number of  Chinese partners willing to take it  on.  Other factors include the limited
capacity  of  some of  the  implementing organisations  in  donor  countries,  where  the
learning curve for engaging effectively in such programming can be steep 78.  Some
development agencies have engaged in such work reluctantly,  under pressure from
politicians.  Knowledge of  human rights issues among staff  of  development agencies
may be limited, while the complex nature of many interventions in this field could be
intimidating. Measuring the impact of programmes aiming at improving human rights
and promoting democratisation is considered difficult 79, and thus the shift to results-
based management of projects many donor agencies have made in recent years may
militate against taking up such work. 
Bad aid can harm
47 An additional reason why a strategic approach is needed is one highlighted by the aid
recipients interviewed for the International Council study. Bad programmes are not
necessarily just a waste of time and money, but may actually do harm: “Badly conceived
and  implemented  programmes  have  sheltered  repressive  regimes  from  scrutiny,
wasted vital resources, distorted domestic institutions and fostered social division” 80.
By contrast, comments on bilateral programmes focused on law in China have generally
assumed that there can be no downside to such assistance 81. 
48 In the China context, it is hard to make an assessment of whether programmes and
projects in this field have caused harm, or have the potential to do so, since they have
been little studied so far. But there are several areas where there is significant cause for
concern:  the  impact  of  the  programmes  on  overall  policy  towards  China;  lack  of
Bilateral Aid To Improve Human Rights
China Perspectives, 51 | january-february 2004
12
attention to monitoring; the focus of some specific projects; and the impact of donor
agendas on certain fields of academic research. 
49 A number of critics of the dialogue and co-operation approach have argued forcefully
that this policy has led to diminution of international scrutiny of China’s human rights
record.  While  examination  of  this  point  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study,  some
comments  on  the  mix  of  policy  options  chosen  are  important  to  the  question  of
strategy.  The  International  Council  study  concludes  that  while  trade-offs  between
legitimate  criticism  and  co-operation  should  not  be  made,  co-operation  should  be
pursued  “except  in  cases  where  the  government  concerned  explicitly  rejects  and
blatantly violates international human rights standards”82.  
50 Chinese informants agreed on the need for both co-operation and pressure, and were
not aware of  the trade-offs  that these programmes often involve.  Virtually without
exception, Chinese scholars interviewed stressed how important international pressure
had been and continued to be in pushing the Chinese government to make human
rights concessions and improvements.  But they found it  difficult  to articulate what
pressure  should  actually  involve,  evincing  a  certain  degree  of  discomfort  about
criticisms of their country. Some pointed out that sometimes pressure could also have
negative effects, creating resistance to change among the powers that be. One asserted
that pressure should be used in a way that didn't make the Chinese government lose
face. 
51 Such  comments  point  to  a  need  for  sensitivity  to  the  context  and  for  greater
understanding  about  specific  human  rights  issues,  and  this  requires  human  rights
monitoring. Good information can be generated by a range of different actors—both
domestic and international—as well as donors themselves. This means donors should
support monitoring, as well as do it, and this is particularly important in the China
context, where quality information on human rights conditions remains very limited,
due to severe restrictions on domestic human rights monitoring. But very few of the
donors  studied  here  have  supported  work  specifically  monitoring  human  rights
conditions,  with  almost  all  excluding  the  work  of  groups  and  individuals  working
outside China 83. As the International Council study points out, monitoring the progress
of reform is also crucial to determining how interventions are working and what kind
of projects work best.
52 While these types of actual or potential harm are more in the nature of acts of omission
rather than commission, a few examples can be cited in which donor approaches may
have created problems more directly.  One example is the three training sessions at
which Australian officials instructed Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) staff
on  reporting  under  the  two  UN  covenants  84.  MoFA  is  essentially  responsible  for
presentation  of  China’s  information  in  the  best  possible  light,  rather  than  the
monitoring of human rights conditions that should be a part of  preparing a report
under a human rights treaty. Australia did not invite any UN staff or members of treaty
bodies to participate in these trainings, let alone any NGOs 85. Recently, Chinese Foreign
Ministry officials said that they were getting better at treaty body reports “so we won’t
be criticised” 86. This is hardly the desired outcome of such “training”.
53 Another example is the way donors may have contributed to resistance to reform on
the part  of  some officials  in the procuracy by an over-concentration on support to
courts  and  on  projects  that enhance  the  authority  of  the  judiciary  87.  However,  a
number of donors now have projects with the procuracy in China 88. 
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54 Some assert that donors’ technical approach to legal reform in China has contributed to
the Chinese government’s belief that it can avoid the normative implications of rule of
law.  Alford argues that  the international  community is  reinforcing an instrumental
view of law and legality in China through “the approach that a number of significant
multilateral, foreign governmental, and non-governmental organisations have taken in
their technical legal assistance work in China. Each has touted the role that law can
play  in  nation  building  while  studiously  avoiding  associated  political  questions  or
implications, as if to suggest that the ‘technical’ side of law that might foster economic
development can somehow be neatly extricated from its more political dimension” 89.
55 Some Chinese scholars felt that donor policies had had some negative effects on certain
academic fields. Agenda-setting by donors in certain areas of scholarly research was a
concern to a number of Chinese scholars interviewed. Shifting donor priorities made
building up a corpus of work in some fields more difficult, one said. A scholar who was
not involved in donor-funded programmes felt that the involvement of foreign donors
had contributed to the field of human rights research becoming overly politicised, and
this meant that few scholars of real quality would be attracted to it.
56 The concentration of  donor funds on a  handful  of  institutions can create  distorted
incentive structures. For example, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has been
known to demand speaking fees for its own staff at conferences it is convening with
donor funds. One implementer complained that some provincial women’s federations
just  saw donors as  “money bags” and didn’t  care much about the substance of  the
projects 90.
57 Finally, many projects are merely wasteful in a context where resources are scarce.
Mostly the problem appears to be shifting donor priorities, which result in what might
be termed “hit and run” projects. The most extreme example of this is the Australian
programme, which is essentially a series of reciprocal study visits with a large number
of institutions mostly unconnected to any practical outcomes or specific reforms. Some
of the largest projects also suffer from short-termism. A key example is the EU’s largest
rule of law project, the EU-China Legal and Judicial Co-operation Project, in which the
main activity  was  extended study visits  of  Chinese  legal  professionals  to  Europe 91.
Enormous energy went into establishing the project, with its own office in Peking and a
high production value website, but after only four years of operation and one round of
research grants, the whole structure is being abandoned. To be sure, some say that the
money could be much better spent on promoting basic legal education in China92, so
there are arguments for not continuing such an expensive form of training, but this is
not the reason why the project is not being continued.
Contextual knowledge, transparency and learning
58 Another  important  element  of  strategy  is  knowledge:  understanding  the  context,
making information about projects available to others and learning from experience.
This is related to the issue of monitoring. In a paper on “rule of law” aid, Carothers
highlights a lack of knowledge in this area of aid more generally:
The rapidly growing field of rule-of-law assistance is operating from a disturbingly
thin base of knowledge at every level—with respect to the core rationale of the
work,  the  question  of  where  the  essence  of  the  rule  of  law actually  resides  in
different societies, how change in the rule of law occurs, and what the real effects
are of changes that are produced. The lessons learned to date have for the most
part  not  been  impressive  and  often  do  not  actually  seem  to  be  learned.  The
obstacles  to  the  accumulation  of  knowledge  are  serious  and  range  from
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institutional shortcomings of the main aid actors to deeper intellectual challenges
about how to fathom the complexity of law itself.93
59 On the donor side, the aid process generally often suffers from a lack of people with in-
depth  country  knowledge and  language  skills  working  on  project  design  and
management, and this tends to be a particular problem in bilateral programmes 94. In
the programmes studied here, levels of knowledge of the staff involved were a critical
factor in determining the quality of projects. 
60 Developing such understanding is no easy task in the China context where there is a
serious shortage of accurate information about the functioning of the legal system 95. A
key example is the serious inadequacy of statistics on the operation of the criminal
justice  system,  with  such  figures  as  the  number  of  executions  per  year  still  being
considered  “state  secrets”.  Several  of  the  more  knowledgeable  people  working  in
implementing agencies complained about the lack of time and money devoted to the
learning necessary for their jobs. Some Chinese informants expressed frustration at the
lack of knowledge of the China context, particularly the political context, among people
working for some donor agencies 96.
61 Such a  lack of  empirical  knowledge is  a  common shortcoming of  legal  and judicial
reform programmes:
The story of legal and judicial reform is one of modest successes… and frequent
failures, and of significant gaps between theoretical understanding of legal systems
and project design and implementation. The gap between theory and practice stems
from  a  number  of  pressures…  It  points  to  the  crucial  need  for  investment  in
empirical approaches to legal systems development and to the invidiousness of the
distinction that  some in the development community make between action and
research.97
62 An important part of the accumulation of knowledge is evaluating work that has been
done.  But  few  evaluations  of  China  projects  have  been  done,  and  some  donors
mentioned that Chinese partners did not like evaluations.98 In many cases, there has
not been sufficient follow-up on donor projects 99. This lack of attention to evaluation
and accumulation of lessons learned is also a common feature of assistance elsewhere
100. One reason for the lack of learning is the strong pressure for success in law and
rights work in China. The linkage of these co-operation projects to donor government
policies means that the assessments of projects is often over-optimistic. But the strong
interest of implementing agencies in continuing to receive funding 101 also militates
against dispassionate assessment. Another reason why people lack information is that
there has been insufficient attention to the circulation of donor-supported research, a
point made by both donors and some Chinese informants. Official funders of scholarly
research in China have not required this, so there is no tradition of doing so.
63 A  further  barrier  to  learning  lessons  is  the  lack  of  transparency.  In  terms  of  the
programmes studied here, only the Nordics and the Netherlands were willing to share
detailed project information and any evaluations with the author. Australia, Canada
and the UK apparently have no provisions for public reporting on how aid money in
this area is spent. Information provided by France was minimal, to say the least. While
transparency rules for the EU are better, since none of the large projects under study
are completed, written information assessing their progress is not available, although
for some projects there are basic reports on some activities 102. Extensive information is
provided on Germany’s legal technical assistance projects implemented by GTZ,103 but
little on other projects.
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64 Transparency  was  an  issue  of  concern  to  Chinese  informants.  Scholars  outside  the
circle  of  those  involved  in  aid-funded projects  expressed  frustration  at  the  lack  of
information about what these were focusing on and how they might apply for funding,
and even some of those receiving funding spoke of donors’  preferences as being “a
black box”. It would be better if the donors could make public the scope of their giving
activities, and open the process up to applications. Some assert that donors tend to
work only with people who speak their language, in both literal and figurative senses. A
small handful of scholars get large amounts of money, said one informant, with obvious
resentment. Confirming such a view, another asserted that it was “easy” to find donor
funding for human rights- and rule of law-related projects.
Ownership and identification of needs
65 The International Council study identifies local “ownership”104 of programmes as a key
element of success—if projects are driven by donors’ concerns and political agendas,
they will not be likely to achieve much. 
66 The process of identifying projects in China has generally meant a lot of legwork by
representatives  of  donors  to  find appropriate  entry  points.  In  most  cases,  personal
contacts had already been made—often related to China’s efforts post-1991 to begin
some engagement on human rights issues—that yielded some initial activities. To start
with  at  least,  Chinese  partners  appear  to  have  been  unwilling  to  identify  gaps  in
knowledge  or  deficiencies  in  practice  that  co-operation  programmes  could  help  to
address. To some extent, this remains a problem today.
67 Representatives of implementing agencies acknowledge that it has often been difficult
to engage Chinese partners in identifying their needs and to encourage them to take
the initiative in proposing projects. This is clearly due in part to the sensitivity of the
subject matter, and the lack of commitment on the Chinese side, since Chinese partners
evidently feel that while they know co-operation is acceptable, they are not sure what
its scope should be. But there are also other factors: for example, it is often the foreign
affairs  departments,  rather  than  the  people  working  on  the  substantive  issue  in
question, who discuss and negotiate projects with donor representatives 105. In addition,
the rubric  of  “co-operation” evidently  means that  the needs of  both sides must  be
accommodated,  and  engagement  of  home country  nationals  and  institutions  in  aid
programmes  is  generally  an  acknowledged  donor  objective  for  aid  policies  106.
Justifiably, Chinese partners see co-operation not as aid, but as exchange, in which the
fact of working together may be more important than what gets done 107. Also, if most
of  the  budget  for  a  particular  project  is  spent  outside  China,  this  understandably
diminishes the commitment of Chinese partners. 
68 Until recently, when the Raoul Wallenberg Institute asked academics what they would
like to do in terms of  co-operation in the human rights  field,  they would turn the
question  around  and  ask  what  RWI  would  like  to  do.  Officials  from  the  Shanghai
procuracy were bemused by RWI’s insistence that the focus of the training materials
should be on Chinese problems, as they wanted to do a book series on Swedish law 108.
Despite its long history of working in China, it has been a struggle for RWI to involve
Chinese partners more in programme planning. 
69 People in implementing agencies involved in British-funded projects mentioned the
difficulty of getting down to projects that were specific enough to have much impact.
Often  years  of  working  together  on  more  general  topics  were  necessary  before  a
Chinese partner would be willing (or able) to engage in a project focused on achieving a
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practical impact on the ground. To reach this point,  the necessary ingredients,  one
person said, were a “good working relationship” with a Chinese partner built up over
several years;  “a process-oriented and participatory approach moving from awareness
raising of rights issues and alternative models of law and practice to the identification
of  a  project  to  address  a  specific  and  defined  problem”;  and  strong  contextual
knowledge 109. As donors tend to be concerned mainly with “outcomes”, they may not
be willing to fund the kind of slow identification process that is often necessary 110. 
70 According to a European Commission official, since governance and human rights are
not China’s priority, the EU has to take the initiative in co-operation in these areas and
“kind  of  impose”  projects  on  the  Chinese  side.  However,  at  the  same  time,  he
recognised that  without  Chinese  ownership,  such projects  would  not  work 111.  This
dilemma has clearly dogged the EU’s entire co-operation programme, and has led to
long delays between the launch date of projects and their actual implementation, as
details  of  how the  objectives  set  by  the  EU side  can be  accommodated by  Chinese
partners  are  worked  out  and  the  extensive  bureaucratic  requirements  of  the
Commission systems are met 112.
71 Few donors consult with Chinese experts beyond their direct partners in any formal
sense  on  the  focus  of  their  programmes  in  China  113.  A  small  minority  of  Chinese
scholars interviewed had been consulted, but most had not even thought of the idea
that donors might need to pay attention to what Chinese people thought. One was very
frustrated that donors did not listen to opinions from Chinese people working in the
relevant  fields  and  just  had  their  own  priorities.  One  who  had  been  involved  in
discussions with donors on training of officials said that the main focus had been not
on  the  specifics  of  the  training,  but  asking  for  advice  on  how  to  negotiate  the
authorities’ phobic attitudes towards critical comments about China. A scholar outside
the circle of recipients was cynical about the motives of fellow academics who worked
as consultants for donor agencies, doubting that they would say if they thought the
approach the donors were using was wrong.
72 A number of Chinese informants felt strongly that donors needed to pay more attention
to local perceptions of needs. “The country needs to change itself, and needs help with
this. But this should be based on needs identified by people in China—not telling them
what  to  do,  or  doing  it  for  them”,  said  one.  Donors  should  not  come  with
preconceptions about what would be useful based on their own system and values, and
should use more Chinese consultants, said another. In their planning, donors should
have more discussion with Chinese academics and officials to identify what are the real
problems that need addressing, stressed another.
73 The Nordic human rights institutes are the only ones that have attempted to consult
with Chinese people in the relevant field on any systematic basis.  Examples are the
feasibility study conducted by RWI in 1999-2000, and the on-going consultation with
academics  through  the  Nordic-sponsored  academic  meetings,  bringing  together
Chinese scholars  of  international  human rights  law and some international  experts
twice  annually  to  discuss  certain  human  rights  topics.  Just  in  the  last  year,  this
consultation has been formalised, as the Nordics have set up an “Education Resource
Group” of four Chinese academics who will provide input on their work on a regular
basis 114.
Focus, choice of partners and co-ordination
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74 Many donors end up working with the same set of institutions,  particularly central
government agencies, the National Judges College and Peking-based universities and
think-tanks,  as  well  as  semi-governmental  agencies,  such as the All-China Women’s
Federation. A range of factors limit the number of Chinese institutions that can engage
in the types of projects covered here, from the need for official approval to the ability
to deal with donor requirements in terms of book-keeping and project management.
Almost every donor has projects involving the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Law
Institute, and many also work with the China University of Politics and Law. Given the
frequent failure to circulate project results and the lack of donor co-ordination, this
sometimes leads to duplication of projects. There is a tendency for donors to work only
with people who can speak English, as this saves time and money, but these may be the
people who least need the kind of exposure which is an important part of such co-
operation programmes. 
75 Although  human  rights  remains  controversial  in  most  contexts—less  so  now  as  a
subject of academic study than in the past—many representatives of donors and some
from  implementing  agencies  were  not  aware  of  approval  processes  that  Chinese
partners  needed  to  go  through  to  work  with  them.  However,  one  said  that  the
universities they work with need to report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on their
co-operation 115. A Chinese scholar said the central government sees human rights as a
“reserve domain”, and does not allow provincial or local level institutions, official or
academic,  to  work  with  foreign  bodies  on  this  subject  without  permission.  Some
internal regulation probably required that provincial or local institutions wishing to
stage an activity of this type apply for permission from the Ministry, this academic
said, adding, however, that the growing density of international interconnectedness
would  make  it  increasingly  difficult  for  the  centre  to  control.  Almost  no  projects
sponsored by the donors under review have been cancelled,116 a fact which could either
indicate  that  official  tolerance  is  increasing,  or  that  donors  have  not  been  very
adventurous in their programming.
76 Scholars and practitioners outside Peking and Shanghai felt that donors concentrate
far too much of their attention on those cities, to the exclusion of other areas. Not only
were  these  cities  not  representative  of  the  country  as  a  whole,  but  also  the
concentration of donor attention made recipients blasé about it, and thus they might
not put in as much energy and commitment to the projects as people in other, less
favoured, areas. Questions can certainly be asked about the relative need for foreign
funds of some of the institutions: for example, while many donors are doing projects to
support high-level training of judges, Shanghai pays to bring in American teachers to
teach  judges  and  sends  its  judges  to  the  United  States  for  a  study  programme 117.
Guangdong  is  planning  to  establish  a  similar  programme  for  its  judges.  The
concentration of donor resources in the richest areas replicates a historical pattern in
aid to China, in which, until recently, the major donors—such as the World Bank and
the  UN  Development  Programme—have  acquiesced  in  supporting  the  central
government’s focus on developing the coastal areas, thus arguably contributing to the
overall pattern of regional inequality 118.
77 The  International  Council  study  identified  co-ordination  between  donors  as  a  key
feature of  successful  programming.  At  a  minimum, this  is  necessary so as  to  avoid
duplication of efforts, but ideally it means pooling resources and supporting broader
approaches than any one donor may be able to mount alone. But unfortunately co-
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ordination is not common: “[B]ilateral donors tend to adopt projects without a general
overview of other donors’ activities. In consequence their impact is only local, and in
any  case  their  choice  of  strategy  usually  reflects  their  own national  priorities  and
idiosyncratic  choices.  For  example,  Sweden  wants  to  export  the  Ombudsman
institution; Germany to disseminate its experience in Constitutional Courts;  and the
United States to transplant its own civil society experience” 119.
78 In  China  such  co-ordination  is  only  practiced  by  the  three  Nordic  human  rights
institutes,  which  initiated  co-operation  to  promote  international  human rights  law
teaching in  1999.  For  the rest,  “co-ordination” is  essentially  limited to  information
sharing. In terms of the dialogue countries, meetings of the “Berne Process” initiated
by  Switzerland  and  the  Office  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  have
brought together the representatives of the dialogue countries on an occasional basis
since April 2001. Co-operation programmes are discussed, but in the main, the people
directly responsible do not attend these meetings, so their utility is very limited. The
Ford Foundation holds meetings of donors in the legal area in Peking once a year, and
there are also occasional meetings of donors working specifically on human rights-
related projects,  but this is not formalised. One indication of the actual level of co-
ordination is  the fact  that a list  serve set  up by the British Council as a forum for
exchange among donors supporting legal projects in China was shut down last year as
it was not being used 120. 
79 The lack of co-ordination can be attributed to a number of factors, including the focus
on promoting national models in countries’ aid programmes, the pressure for success
due to the linkage to broader foreign policy goals, the desire of many donors to “be in
China” and competition among donors. Such a competitive environment is a common
problem in aid generally. Even in a climate of commitment to reform, such as that in
Russia, donors were all doing competing judicial training projects, rather than pooling
their funds to support a comprehensive training programme 121. Of course it could be
argued  that  the  proliferation  of  different  projects  potentially  promotes  more
democratic and multi-faceted approaches to reform. This might be the case if donors
were primarily funding NGOs. But in addressing official rule of law building, as in the
Russia  case  and many of  the  China  projects,  they  are  trying to  engage  with  broad
questions  of  institutional  reform that  require  systemic  solutions  and large  sums of
money.
80 Some of the donors studied here could certainly make more effort to go beyond the safe
circle of recipients and to support those in Chinese society who are explicitly (or even
implicitly) committed to working towards achieving practical human rights goals. For
example, they could provide more support for legal aid,  including that provided by
non-lawyers,  and fund independent organisations and networks involved in specific
human rights issues, including those outside the legal sphere. This might mean putting
more money into  funds to  be  disbursed as  small  grants  with minimal  bureaucratic
requirements. They could also remove limitations that exclude certain types of human
rights-related projects, in particular support for exile organisations or human rights
projects outside China 122. 
81 Two Chinese scholars thought that the key area of concentration for donors should be
the implementation of law. Giving money for pure scholarship was a waste, thought
one informant, but donors should be more willing to support empirical studies, which
were often costly. Another view was that more effort should be made to support work
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that found bases for rights in local and traditional concepts.  Since academics could
change people’s thinking, supporting their work would be a very important component
of helping China build up its own capacity to establish the rule of law and protections
for human rights 123. Several said that donors should be more willing to put money into
improving  basic  legal  education  (not  necessarily  human  rights  related),  something
most seemed unwilling to do at present.
82 Some legal scholars were critical of the overly theoretical emphasis of much academic
work in the field, which, they said, focuses too much on what is good and what is right,
and not  what  is  possible.  Also,  academic  work may have  more  impact  in  stages  of
legislative reform than in the messy business of law implementation, where political
commitment  and broader  social  conditions  become more  important.  People  on  the
front-lines of law implementation may have better ideas about how to address real
problems than academics 124. However, one implementer emphasised that Chinese legal
scholars  have  always  had  a  much  stronger  role  in  policy  formulation  than  their
Western  counterparts,  so  it  remained  important  to  work with  them  as  a  way  of
influencing government 125.
83 Chinese  informants  expressed  contradictory  views  about  the  potential  of  the
international human rights law field and the contribution of donors to its expansion.
The efforts of the Nordic countries to promote teaching in the field, particularly their
focus on developing a network of  teachers,  were much appreciated by the scholars
involved.  An academic  who was  in  a  different  field  of  law and one who no longer
worked on international human rights law topics, however, were dismissive of what
might be achieved through study of human rights in the current political climate in
China, seeing no possible practical benefits from the resulting scholarship, and little
scope for real academic achievements, either, due to the restrictions on what scholars
in the field might research and publish.
84 Several  Chinese  interviewees  felt  that  donors  had  an  overly  narrow  conception  of
rights and how to support their improvement in China. According to one scholar, a
broader  approach  was  needed  that  addressed  rights  issues  on  the  level  of  civic
education about the role law could and should play in society. A number of Chinese
informants  were  concerned  about  donors’  interests  in  overly  “political”  projects.
Certain donors want too much specific involvement, both in terms of substance and
administration, said one.
85 After more than five years of human rights dialogues, privately many diplomats say
that these meetings themselves achieve little,  and that the real  achievement of the
policy has been in the co-operation programmes 126. Thus, on donors’ own terms, the
kind of work studied here should be considered as a measure of the success of this
policy approach. But the lack of clear objectives for the co-operation framed in terms of
specific human rights improvements means that in general the fact that an activity
took place at all is often sufficient for donors to claim success. Thus donors’ reporting
on the co-operation tends to be quantitative rather than qualitative in nature: how
many people went on such and such a training, what kind of a seminar was staged, or
the  visit  of  a  Chinese  delegation  to  the  donor  country  on  a  study  tour,  without
identifying the actual or potential impact, or even linking the activity in question to
any specific reform agenda. By contrast, reports of some implementing agencies are
more likely to make an attempt to identify impacts of their work 127. 
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86 This is not to say that the programmes under review have not achieved anything, or
that the activities they have supported may not be worthwhile. But often, as outlined in
this article, too little information is available to allow for a meaningful assessment of
what the achievements—actual and potential—might be. 
87 Of course, changes over the life of these programmes in the overall political climate in
which  they  operate—particularly  the  growth  of  more  independent  non-profit
organisations and more media reporting on sensitive subjects including those related
to rights issues—mean that conditions for donor-funded projects have improved to a
certain extent, affecting the sensitivity of issues that can be addressed and the degree
of  practicality  of  some  projects.  Donors  and  implementing  agencies  learning  from
experience  and  building  trust  with  Chinese  partners  through  co-operation  over  a
number of years have undoubtedly contributed something to the changed atmosphere.
Notable  among the  improvements  are  the  current  fad  for  human rights  centres  in
universities,  the  fact  that  the  Ministry  of  Education now lists  international  human
rights law as an approved elective course for law faculties and the expectation that the
Ministry may soon make such a course mandatory. 
88 In the light of the analysis presented here, it is no surprise to find that the field of
education on international  human rights  law has  experienced some breakthroughs.
 This may be attributed to a number of factors, including the interventions of donors,
particularly the Nordic human rights institutes. The struggle of the Nordic institutes to
contribute to the development of international human rights law education in China is
instructive  in  what  can  be  achieved  through  a concerted,  longer-term  approach
involving greater co-operation between donors. 
89 There is evidently a need for a more coherent and thoughtful strategy on the part of
the donors. In sum, donors need to address the following areas: support more empirical
work on the legal system and human rights to help guide their work; in work with
government agencies, adopt a more concerted approach, involving donor co-ordination
and encouraging rights-related planning; put more effort into reaching out beyond the
usual  set  of  favoured  institutions  to  support  Chinese  actors  engaging  with  rights
concerns;  and  choose  a  better  mix  of  policy  options  combining  pressure  with
engagement. 
90 Making such changes is far from an easy task: a substantial proportion of the strategy
deficit is not unique to the China context; some of its effects are common features of
aid  programmes in  the  rule  of  law field  more  generally.  Thus  donors  also  need to
address some broader problems, such as the fact that priorities set through domestic
political  and  institutional  processes  in  the  donor  country  are  not  always  the  most
useful ones in a given country context. Furthermore, the mixed motives of donors—
including  the  insistence  on  employing  home  country  institutions  and  experts,
regardless  of  their  levels  of  contextual  knowledge  or  expertise  and  the  confusion
between supporting the needs of multinationals and rights-friendly rule of law—create
additional barriers to achieving the human rights objectives through aid programmes.
91 In the China context, among the most crucial manifestations of the strategy deficit are
the lack of attention to empirical work—including human rights monitoring—which
would help to determine the most appropriate kind of interventions, and the failure to
encourage  and  support  processes  of  official  planning  at  macro-level  and  needs
identification  at  micro-level.  Empirical  approaches  would  lead  to  specific  solutions
aimed at concrete problems, rather than one-size-fits-all rule of law answers, which, as
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studies of aid to legal reform have found, are at best likely to be a waste of time and
money. An example is judicial training: a number of authoritative studies have found
that if training is not connected to an agreed reform agenda that includes incentives to
change it may have little effect 128. The idea that mere exposure of a few individuals to
foreign models of practice can be sufficient to induce change is naïve, and has led to
much waste of resources. 
92 Adopting  a  strategic  approach  does  not  mean  that  donors  impose  their  views  and
priorities  on  Chinese  partners.  As  one  implementer  put  it,  “[T]here  must  be  local
ownership in defining the problem and how it may be solved—and then we have to
welcome and accept that projects don’t necessarily turn out the way we had imagined”
129.
93 Thus one of the central questions is who to engage with, particularly whether the elite-
focussed  approaches  donors  have  adopted are  the  most  likely  to  affect  the  human
rights situation on the ground. Could the lengthy process of trust-building (and the
necessity of donors taking the initiative to start with rather than following the lead of
their Chinese partners) mean that they and other donors have been concentrating their
attention  on  the  wrong  type  of  people  and  groups?  What  if  they  had  begun  by
exploring what type of initiatives Chinese individuals and institutions were taking that
could have an impact on various human rights problems—regardless of whether these
are labelled as such by those working on them and regardless of what their field of
endeavour is—and tried to support such efforts, both financially and through opening
up international channels of communication and expertise to them? 
94 In a society in which rights violations increasingly reflect class divisions, the degree of
commitment of intellectuals as a group to addressing the sources of violations may
even  be  suspect:  “Since  [1989]  the  government  has  bribed  intellectuals  with  fat
paycheques—university professors’ salaries have increased by a factor of ten in the last
decade. Universities and research institutes have been showered with grant money.
Most intellectuals now lead comfortable lives and are allowed to publish their ideas
fairly freely” 130. Yet many donor programmes expect academics to be more activist in
China than they are elsewhere.
95 Donors  evidently  need to  put  more  effort  into  identifying areas  where  groups  and
individuals have already started engaging with human rights issues on their own and
be more willing to take risks on supporting such initiatives. It is very clear that where
there is  already a strong constituency in China working on an issue,  there is  great
potential.  Examples  are  the  nationwide  Domestic  Violence  Network,  currently
supported by a consortium of donors, and the work of Wan Yanhai and his colleagues
on HIV/AIDS issues 131,  as well  as some criminal procedure law scholars working to
introduce international standards into domestic law 132.  It should also be recognised
that although much can be done inside China these days, there is still an important role
to be played by human rights groups conducting advocacy outside the country.  An
example is that they are still the only ones that are able to lobby and submit shadow
reports  to  UN  treaty  bodies  considering  reports  on  China's  compliance  with
international human rights standards. 
96 Some donors have established grant-making programmes that support more locally-
generated  projects.  However,  these  often  end  up  funding  the  same  semi-official
agencies as other donor programmes. It would help if application processes were made
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more open and simple, and efforts were put into disseminating information about how
to apply.
97 Of course there is also value in pursuing projects with more official partners, provided
they are able to address practical concerns. A positive example here is the work of a
number  of  UK  implementing  agencies,  funded  both  by  the  UK  and  by  the  EU,  on
juvenile justice issues133 and child trafficking in southwest China 134.
98 Along  the  same  lines,  the  appropriateness  of  the  exclusive  focus  on  the  formal
apparatus of law as an entry point for human rights concerns in China can also be
challenged.  After  a  frustrating  experience  of  failure  in  US  programmes  on
“administration  of  justice”  aimed  at  improving  legal  institutions  in  many  Latin
American  countries,  the  need  to  pay  attention  to  the  “demand side”  is  now being
discussed 135.  In other words,  if  people don’t  demand that their rights be protected
through the legal system, practices won’t change. But to do this one needs to go beyond
legal institutions to support such entities as community groups, bodies providing legal
services to the poor, media reporting of legal processes, and so on. 
99 In  China,  while  such grassroots  groups have been developing in  recent  years,  they
remain  constrained  by  central  and  local  authorities’  desire  to  control  independent
organisations.  This points to another element of  strategy:  that donors may need to
engage more with the political obstacles in the way of achieving more human rights-
oriented  legal  reform  if  they  are  serious  about  this  kind  of  co-operation.  Chinese
informants for this study were virtually unanimous in asserting that international
pressure has played an important role in contributing to human rights concessions by
the Chinese government, and if there is a trade-off between the donor programmes
covered here and continuing to exert such pressure, this is something they would not
find  acceptable.  Their  message  was  clear:  people  want  both  co-operation  and
continuing pressure on the government, and the two have an essential synergy. This is
one  reason  why  the  terminology  issue  is  important—making  human  rights  work
labelled  as  such  politically  acceptable  potentially  expands  the  space  for  domestic
activism,  and makes it  easier  for  people  to  engage in co-operative projects  on this
theme.
100 Such engagement need not lead only to what the Chinese government dismisses as
“confrontation”,  but  could  involve  assistance  and  encouragement  to  the  Chinese
authorities to engage in exercises that identify their priorities in the human rights
field, such as formulating a National Human Rights Plan of Action with assistance from
the United Nations, employing the kind of participatory processes recommended. This
could potentially open up the field of  engagement and allow donor programmes to
have more impact. It would serve to generate a national dialogue on human rights,
which would open up space for domestic human rights advocates—arguably the most
crucial aspect of achieving practical change on the ground.
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and not susceptible to the kind of measuring of inputs and outputs to which
development agencies have become accustomed. See for example, Gunnar M. Sorbo and
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